Dan Leatham, Robert E. Steele, Tim Slocum, Harold W. Johnson, and W. Fred Hurst v. Utah Department of Corrections and the Utah Career Service Review Board : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Dan Leatham, Robert E. Steele, Tim Slocum,
Harold W. Johnson, and W. Fred Hurst v. Utah
Department of Corrections and the Utah Career
Service Review Board : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Phillip W. Dyer, Carey A. Seager; Law Offices of Phillip Dyer; Attorneys for Appellants.
Brent A. Burnett; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Leatham v. Utah Department of Corrections, No. 20040376 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4974
IN THE U I AH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE.
TIM SLOCUM. HAROLD W. JOHNSON.
andW. FRED HURST,
Petitioners,
LTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE
REVIEW BOARD.
Respondents.
Case No. 20040376-CA
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
K F U
SG
.A10
DOCKET NO. SOOJO'S-I-Q-CA
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal of the Final Decision of the Utah Career Service
Review Board, an Administrative Agency of the State of Utah
PHILLIP W.DYER
CAREY A. SEAGER
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP DYER
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Attorneys for Petitioners
BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South. Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801)366-0100
Attorney for Respondents
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION WOfh /u-r
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENTS
rc.h
•' )' >')T-.
IN THE II AH COURT OF APPEALS
DAN LEATHAM. ROBERT E. STEELE,
TIM Sl.OUUM. HAROLD W. JOHNSON,
and W. 1 RED HURST.
Petitioners.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and I HI; UTAH CAREER SERVICE
REVIEW BOARD.
Respondents.
Case No. 2004o3~6-CA
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal of the Final Decision of the 1"tan Career Service
Re\ iew Board, an Administrative Auencv of the State of 1 tah
PHILLIP W. DYER
CAREY A. SEAOER
LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP DYER
221 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Attomevs for Petitioners
BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
100 East 300 South. Sixth Floor
P. (). Box 140856
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Attorney for Respondents
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENTS
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
To the best of Respondents' knowledge, all interested parties appear in the caption
of this Brief.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES .... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11
ARGUMENT 12
I. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF THE CSRB 12
II. THE CSRB DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN INTERPRETING
ITS OWN EXCUSABLE NEGLECT RULE 15
III. PETITIONERS NEED TO TIMELY FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE
WAS NOT TOLLED BY A DISCOVERY RULE 18
CONCLUSION 20
RESPONDENTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21
ADDENDUM - No Addendum arc needed under the rules
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc..
920 P.2d 575 (Utah App 1996) 19-20
Ashcroft v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 19931 16
Bercnda v. Lanefbrd, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) 20
Bd. of Educ. of Rogers. Arkansas v. MeCluskey. 458 U.S. 966 0 982) 16-17
Bukholz v. Joyce. 972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998) 19
CSRB v. UtahDep'tofCorr.. 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997) 2
Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell. 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982) 16
Covey v. Covey. 2003 UT App 380, 80 P.3d 553 14
E.M. v. Briggs. 922 P.2d 754 (Utah 1996) 16
Holland v. CSRB. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993) 2, 15-16
Lilly v. Vermont Headmasters Ass'n. Inc.. 648 A.2d 810 (Vt. 1993) 17-18
McKnight v State Land Bd.. 381 P.2d 726 (Ulah 1963) 16
Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84 (1 hah 1981) 19
Road Runner Oil. Inc. v. Bd. of Oil. Gas andJVIining.
2003 UT App 275, 76 P.3d 692 14
Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629 (1 Itah 1995) 19
Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 995 P.2d 14 19
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229 (I Itah 1QQM 19
Warren v, Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) 19
-ii-
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46F-14 (1997) 1
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (2000) 2-3. 11, 12. 15
Utah Code Ann. § 7S-2a-3 (2002) 1
Utah Administrative Code. R137-1 -2 3.5.6. 12. 15
Utah Administrative Code. R137-1-13 3
Utah Administrative Code. Rl 37-1 -22 3-4
Utah Administrative Code. R477-S-6 4. 5
-in-
IN THE UTAH COURT OE APPEALS
DAN LEATHAM. ROBERT E. STEELE.
TIM SLOCUM. HAROLD W. JOHNSON,
and W.ERED HURST,
Petitioners.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and THE: CAREER SERVICE REVIEW
HOARD of the State of Utah.
Respondents.
Case No. 20040376-CA
BRIEF OK RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF.JURISDICTION
The Decision and final Agency Action of die Career Sen ice Review Board
(CSRB) was entered on April 14. 2004. R. 400-523. The Petitioners" Petition for
judicial Review was filed on May 12. 2O04. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 7S-2a-3(2)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 {1907).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The record supports the CSRH's conclusion that the petitioners did not show
excusable neglect for their delay in filing their grievance.
This issue was considered by the CSRB in its Decision and final Agency Action.
R. 504-1S.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 'fins Court reviews an agency's interpretation of its
own rules or regulations for abuse of discretion. Ho land v. CSRH, 856 P.2d 678, 682
(I itah App. 1003). This Court reviews the "CSRH's conclusion for correctness, granting
no deference to that agency's decision." Id.
I he CSRH's role in examining the Department's personnel actions is a
limited one. The CSRH is restricted to determining whether there is factual
support lor the Department's charges against |a grievant] and. if so, whether
the Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate to those
charges that it amounts to an abuse of discielion.
Career Service Review Bd. v. I Itah Pcp't of Con.. 042 P.2d 933, 942 (Utah 1997).
DETERMLNA'IIX'E CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
67M9a-4()l. Time limits for submission of appeal hy a«j>rieveri employee ~
Voluntary termination of employment ~ (iroiip ^rievunces.
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the
restrictions contained m this part, a career service employee may have a
grievance addressed by following the procedures specified in this part.
(2) 'I he employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2. 3. or 4 or the time
limits specified \ov those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402.
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the
administrator.
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next
step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance.
(b) I nless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next
step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is
considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step.
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review under
this chapter only if the employee submits the grievance:
(I) within 2(1 working days after the event giving rise to the uricvance; or
(ill within 20 working days after the emplovee has knowledge of the event
giving rise to the grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5 1(a). an employee may not submit a
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
(6) A person who has \oluntarily terminated his emplovment with the state
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment.
(7) (a) When several employees allege the >ame grievance, they mav submit
a group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of this chapter.
(b) In submitting a group grievance, each aggrieved employee shall sign the
complaint.
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a class
action, but may select one aggrieved emplovee's gne\ance and address that
grievance as a test case.
l'tah Administrative Code. R137-1-2
"Excusable Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably
prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at the proper
time, not in consequence oi the person's own carelessness, inattention, or
willful disregard in the processing of a grievance, but in consequence of
some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.
l'tah Administrative Code. R137-l-13(3)
(3) Excusable Neglect. The standard of excusable neglect may be offered as
a defense to lack of timeliness in processing a grievance or for not
appearing at a scheduled proceeding.
(a) The administrator or appointed CSRB hearing officer shall determine
the applicability of the excusable neglect standard on the basis of good
cause.
(b) All questions are to be resolved at the original level of occurrence.
l'tah Administrative Code. R137-l-22(4)
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review
based upon the following criteria:
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer arc reasonable and rational according
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may. in its
discretion, correct the factual findings, and also make new or additional
factual findings.
(b) Once the board has either determined that ihe factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to the correctness
standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision
of the CSRB hearing officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon :he ultimate factual findings
and conect application of relevant policies, rules, and statules determined
according to the above provisions.
Itah Administrative (ode, R477-8-6(8)(c)
(c) On-call time: An employee required by agency management to be
available lor on-call work shall be compensated for on-call time at a rate of
one hour for every 12 hours the employee is or-call.
(I) Time is considered "on-call time" when the employee has freedom of
movement in personal matters as long as the employee is available for call
to duty.
(ii) An employee must be directed by his supervisor, either verbally or in
writing, that he is on call for a specified time period. Carrying a beeper or
cell phone shall not constitute on-call time without a specific directive from
a supervisor.
(iii) The employee shall record the hours spent in on-call status on his time
sheet in order to be paid.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dan Leatham. Robert E. Steele. Tim Slocum. I larold W. Johnson and W. Fred
Hurst filed their employee grievance on January 30, 1998.' R. 1-3. In their grievance.
petitioners sought compensation for time that they had been required to be "on-call."
• While dated January 30, 1998, there was confusion over when the grievance was
actually filed. The CSRB ruled that it was filed on January 30, 1998, and that decision
has not been challenged on appeal. R. 502-4.
Utah's Human Resource Management Rules require that an employee be compensated for
time the\ are required to be "'on-call" at the rate of one hour for every twelve hours spent
"on-call." Ctah Administrative Code. R477-8-6( 8)(cf The Department of Corrections
granted the grievance, but only allowed retroactive relief for the period of twenty working
da\s prior to the filing of the grievance. R. 23-25.
On appeal to the CSRB. Corrections" decision was affirmed by the hearing officer
on October 12. 2001. R. 193-202. Petitioners asked the hearing otliccr to reconsider his
ruling on October 30, 200 1. R. 203-14. On reconsideration, the hearing officer amended
his prior decision, but again dismissed the appeal. R. 251-57. Petitioners filed a timely
appeal with the CSRB. R. 259-00. 'I he CSRB remanded this matter to the hearing
officer "to make an evidentiary determination on the sole issue of as to whether there was
excusable neglect allowing the Grievants to wait until January or February 1998 to file
their grievance concerning on-call time." R. 337.
On remand, the hearing officer made supplemental findings ot fact and concluded
that the petitioners had not shown excusable neglect for the late filing of their grievance.
R. 304-75. On further administrative review, the 1learing Officer's decision was
sustained by the CSRB on April 14. 2004. R. 490-523. Petitioners' Petition for Judicial
Rewew was filed on Mav 12. 2004.
STATKMFNT Ol KELK\ ANT FACTS
"fhc following lacts are taken from the findings of fact of the hearing officer, 'fhc
petitioners have not sought to challenge these findings.
1. Grievants were career service employees at the time of filing their
original grievance on January 30, 1998. Dan Leatham, Robert F. Steele,
Tim Slocum and W. Fred Ihirst arc presently employed by the Agency.
I larold W. (Bill) Johnson retired from the Agency after the filing of the
grievance.
2. At all times pertinent herein. Grieva us were all employed in
upper management positions in the Agency's Division of Institutional
Operations. As such, Grievants were all identified, by virtue of their
positions, as Federal Labor Standards Act (LLSA) exempt.
3. During the period from 1994 until July 1997, the Agency was
under the direction of a prior administration, which did not require
Grievants to submit time sheets. Grievants understood that part of the
reason they were not expected to submit time sheets was due to their M.SA
exempt status.
4. (irievants had a subjective fear that if thev challenged the
practices of'.he prior administration, they would possibly be subjected to
retaliatory transfers or other actions by the prior administration.
5. The current administration, which came to power in July 1997,
notified employees that there would be no retaliation against employees
who filed grievances.
6. Grievants began completing and submitting time sheets in July
1997, when the issue ol on-call compensation was addressed by the
Agency's new management.
7. From July 1997 forward, each Grievant reported on-call time for
periods when he served as the Officer in Charge. Fach Grievant was
compensated for the on-call time he reported oi his time sheets.
8. Mr. Mike Chabnes, the Agency Fxecutive Director, found as part
of his decision at the Step 4 level of this grievance that Mr. Leatham, Mr.
Steele, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Hurst were entitled to on-call compensation
beyond the hours they claimed on their original time sheets by virtue of
being assigned a commute vehicle. The commule vehicles were approved
for these employees on the grounds that they were on-call during off-duty
hours.
9. Mr. Slocum was considered to be entitled to on-call compensation
bv virtue of his Post Order.
10. Each Grievant was allowed to file amended time sheets for
additional hours of on-call time. However. Mr. Chabries limited the scope
of his decision to the 20-day period immediately preceding the date on
which Grievants filed their original grievance, and continuing prospectively
until the date on which Mr. Leatham, Mr. Steele, Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Hurst turned in their assigned vehicles, which occurred sometime at the end
ofJanuary 1998.
1 1. Mr. Slocum was allowed to file amended time sheets for the 20-
dav period immediately preceding February 11, 1998. and continuing
prospectively from that date to such time as Mr. Slocum's Post Order
assignment changed, or until he had actual notice that his duties as Deputy
Warden of Support Services no longer included carrying a pager and
responding on activation, day or night. The date of such occurrence was
not identified in Mr. Chabries' decision.
Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Motion in Limine Including Findings of
Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Decision. R. 194-95.
1. Grievants were entitled to compensation for on-call time during
the period of time when they were required to carry pagers during off-duty
hours, and when they were assigned commute vehicles. Grievant Slocum
had a commute vehicle until February 1996. Thereafter. Grievant Slocum
continued to be on call by reason of a Post Order. Grievants Featham.
Steele, Johnson and Hurst were on call by virtue of the requirement to carry
pagers and the assignment of commute vehicles. These four Grievants had
commute vehicles from 1994 to January 1998.
2. Since 1990 the Agency has had 4 Executive Directors. Their
terms of office were as follows:
Term of Office
Name From To
GaryDeLand —- 1/4/92
Lane McCotter 1/4/92 7/11/97
Pete Hauii 7/23/97 1/2/01
Mike Chabries 1/0/01 Present
3. Daring the 1990's, Grievants had been subjected to arbitrary
transfers and had seen others transferred either arbitrarily or as retaliation
for filing grievances or complaints.
4. Prior to 1992, there was an occasion when an employee identified
as Mr. Lund was ordered by the Executive Director to delete unfavorable
information from a report about an employee who was under investigation
at the time. The employee refused to obey the order, and ended up
resigning from the Agency.
5. On one occasion prior to July 7. 1997, the Agency Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) reported more than 80 hours on his time sheet for a two-
week period. The Executive Director ordered the hearing officer to change
his time sheet to show 80 hours worked for the lime period. The ALJ
altered his time sheet to show 80 hours, but submitted it with a statement
that he was submitting a false time sheet. The ALJ worked in the same
general area as the office of the Executive Director, and observed the
Executive Director react angrily to the statemcnl. but then signed the time
sheet.
6. The Agency ALJ was once threatened with termination by the
same Executive Director for issuing a Report and Recommendation
Decision concerning an Agency employee.
7. During the same Executive Director's last year in office, and
some time after the ALJ had been threatened with termination for the
Report and Recommendation, the Executive Director issued a General
Orderprohibiting the ALJ from hearing any employee grievances. This was
a significant change in duties for the ALJ, as he had for many years prior to
the new General Order, routinely heard employee's grievances and made
Reports and Recommendations for the Executive Director.
8. About two months after the General Order was issued, as the ALJ
was giving employee training to a group of Agency employees, he
explained the General Order to the employees. One employee asked, "How
can we get a fair hearing?"
9. The ALJ was given a written reprimand by the same Executive
Director on the last day of that Director's administration. The ALJ felt that
the reprimand was in retaliation for his open disagreement with several of
the Director's actions concerning Agency employees.
10. Prior to becoming Executive Director in July 1997, Pete Haun
had worked for the federal government in the Salt Lake City area for 25
years, in the field of pardons and parole. lie then worked on the Utah
Board of Pardons from 1989 until his appointment as Executive Director of
the Agency. During these years, Mr. Haun became aware of some of the
attitudes and perceptions of employees in the Agency.
11. One of Mr. Haun's first actions after becoming Executive
Director was to rescind the General Order that prohibited the ALJ from
hearing employee grievances. Mr. Haun instituted an open door policy, and
over the years of his administration, he visited many Agency facilities and
talked to hundreds of employees. He used the RAP Sheet, which was an
Agency internal newsletter, meetings with employees, and word of mouth to
let the employees know they could file grievances without fear of
retaliation.
12. In October 1997. Mr. Haun wrote in the RAP Sheet, the
Agency's in-house newsletter: tLSome of the immediate steps we have taken
to promote positive working conditions for employees include a top-to-
bottom review of the Code of Conduct, and a complete revision of staff
discipline and grievance procedures. Before the changes are adopted, we
will ask for suggestions and employee review. Wc will make these changes
available for your review by the beginning of December."
13. Mr. Haun felt that the Bureau of Investigations within the
Agency was general]}' perceived by Agency employees as somewhat "high-
handed1" in its dealings with Agency employees. It even investigated itself.
He therefore decided to reorganize the Bureau. This decision caused a
degree of dissatisfaction in some of the management employees of the
Bureau, including some of the Grievants.
14. Approximately 150 audits of the Agency led to the conclusion
that the Agency was out of compliance with State laws, rules or policies in
approximately 182 areas. One of these areas was the use of commute cars
by Agency management employees. Mr. Haun's decision to discontinue the
use of commute cars was to put the Agency in compliance with State
requirements.
15. On December 16. 1997, Mr. Haun issued a letter to employees
of the Gunnison facility, advising the employees of his intent to visit the
facility and meet with employees. As a response to communications he had
previously received, Mr. Haun specifically stated that retribution against
employees for stating concerns or problems would not be tolerated.
16. After making the announcement of his planned visit to the
Gunnison facility, Mr. Haun received an anonymous call or letter saying
that people would not come fonvard out of fear. Mr. Haun's prior
experience with anonymous communications led him to believe there was
no merit to the claim.
17. Mr. Haun's personal studies indicated to him that it may take as
much as seven years to change an institutional culture. Mr. Haun felt this
was particularly true for an institutional culture as deeply seated as the
Agency's.
18. A current employee of the Agency. Mr. EeBounty, was
involuntarily transfeiTed twice during the 1990's. The second involuntary
transfer occurred during Mr. Haun's administration.
19. One of the Grievants, Harold Johnson, who was serving as
Deputy Warden in July 1997 when Mr. Haun became the Executive
Director of the Agency, saw several staff members who were transferred,
demoted or dismissed after filing grievances prior to Mr. Haun's
administration.
20. One of the Grievants, Daniel Leatham, heard a rumor after his
commute car was taken away, that the ears were taken away because the
Agency did not want to be obligated for on-ca ;I pay. Mr. Leatham
thereafter researched whether on-call time was compensable for
management employees. After concluding that on-call time was
compensable for himself and others in his situation, Mr. Leatham told his
fellow Grievants about his conclusion. Mr. LeathanTs research occurred
during the first or second week of January 1998.
21. State employees have been entitled to on-call pay by Utah
Administrative Code (1997) R477-8-6(8)(c)(I) or its predecessors since at
least 1991.
22. Grievants filed their grievance with the Department Head, Mr.
Haun, on February 5. 1998.
23. When the grievance reached Executive Director Haun's level, he
remanded it to Scott Can'cr, an employee in the Division of Institutional
Operations, with an invitation to Grievants to mediate the matter with Mr.
Carver.
24. After receiving the invitation from Mr. Haun to mediate their
grievance, Grievants met with Mr. Carver. At some point in the meeting
between Mr. Carver and Grievants. Mr. Carver told Grievants that he,
Carver, would not have filed a grievance because "that's just something you
don't do over this kind of issue."
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision After Remand. R. 365-68.
: o
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Absent a showing of excusable neglect, a state employee must file a grievance
"within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance." Utah Code Ann. 67-
19a_401(5)(a)(]) (2000). The statute delegates to the CSRB the authority to define, by
rule, what will constitute excusable neglect. Applying the facts of this action to its
excusable neglect standard, the CSRB found that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate
that the 20 working day statute of limitations should be waived. This decision should be
affirmed on appeal.
The CSRB's inquiry was factual in nature. Both the hearing officer and the CSRB
considered the facts, including claims of fear and intimidation by prior Agency
administrations prevented the petitioners from filing their grievance earlier. This claim
was rejected based on the evidence that, from July 1997 to January 30, 1998, during
Executive Director Haun's administration of the agency, that no excusable neglect existed
for the petitioners delay in filing their grievance. The petitioners failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the CSRB's challenged factual finding and their challenge should
therefore be rejected.
Nor does the discovery Rile require that the statute of limitations be tolled.
Petitioners were aware at all times of the facts upon which their claim rested. A belated
discovery7 of a theory of recovery does not the statute of limitations.
11
ARGUMENT
A state employee's grievance must be filed "within 20 working days after the
event giving rise to the grievance" "|u]nless the employee meets the requirements for
excusable neglect established by rule." Utah Code /Vim. 67-19a-401(5)(a) (2000). The
CSRB has defined excusable neglect as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably
prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in
consequence of the person's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in the
processing of a grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable
hindrance or accident." Utah Administrative Code R137-1-2.
Petitioners received the relief they sought from the Department of Corrections.
But that relief was limited to the statutory period of 20 working days prior to the filing of
their grievance. Their appeal only challenges the application of this statute of limitation
to how much retroactive relief they should receive.
I. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE CSRB
The CSRB ruled that the petitioners' failure to file their grievance earlier was not
the result of excusable neglect. This conclusion was :iased on a review of the evidence
that petitioners claimed showed that their fear of retaliation excused their waiting to file
their grievance. The hearing officer found that excusable neglect existed prior to July
1997. due to the atmosphere created and maintained within the respondent department by
12
its administration. R. 373. But the hearing officer found that this atmosphere changed
radically with the appointment as Executive Director of Mr. Haun. The hearing officer
found no excusable neglect for the petitioners failure to file their grievance from July
1997 until January 1998. R. 373-75.
In affirming the hearing officer's factual decision, the CSRB explained that the
hearing officer's finding that no excusable neglect existed was "reasonable and rational
and supported by the evidentiary record/" R. 515. The Board reviewed the evidentiary
record and found that it supported the hearing officer's decision. R. 514.
Based upon these factors, the Board finds that in reaching his
conclusion that after Mr. Haun became Executive Director, Appellants did
not have "excusable neglect" to wait until January 30, 1998. to file their
grievance, the Hearing Officer did not abuse thebroad discretion granted to
him to make this determination. His decision is reasonable and rational and
supported by the evidentiary record. Moreover, the Hearing Officer clearly
weighed and considered the conflicting evidence before reaching his
decision. (Decision 2 at 10-12) For these reasons the Board sustains the
Hearing Officer's finding that Appellants lacked "excusable neglect" based
on fear of retaliation after Mr. Haun became executive director of the
Department.
R. 515 (footnote omitted).
This factual finding is the basis of petitioners' appeal. Brief of
Appellants/Petitioners at 12-29. While relying on some facts from the record, the
petitioners fail to marshal the evidence that supports the CSRB's conclusion.
Apart}' challenging the factual findings of the CSRB has a duty to marshal the
evidence.
Furthermore, when challenging an agency action as not based upon
substantial evidence, appellants have a duty to marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the
[Board's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Road Runner Oil Inc. v. Bd. of Oil. Gas and Mining, 2003 UT App 275.1|10, 76 P.3d
692 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Covey v. Covey. 2003
UT App 380.1|27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's
findings of fact, Almon must first marshal all the evidence in support, of the finding[s]
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findingfs]
even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.") (internal quotations
omitted).
Rather than marshal the evidence that supports the CSRB's conclusion, petitioners
claim that the CSRB failed to support its conclusions with adequate findings of fact.
Brief of Appellants/Petitioners at 28-29. This claim is erroneous. The CSRB relied upon
the hearing officer's factual findings that the excusable neglect requirement had not been
met. R. 373-75, 515. The CSRB's decision also reviews and cites to the evidence that
supports its conclusion. R. 514. It is the petitioners who have failed to marshal this
evidence, and all other evidence of record that supports the CSRB's decision.
Petitioners faded to marshal the evidence. Their challenge to the factual finding of
the CSRB should therefore be rejected.
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II. HIE CSRB DID NOT AIH SE ITS DISCRETION IN
INTERPRETING ITS OWN EXCUSAHI.E NEGLECT RILE
The legislature pro\ ided an exception to the 20 working day statute of limitations
for tiling employee grievances. In cases of excusable neglect, a grievance can be filed as
m uch as a vear after the e\cnt cnine rise to the grievance. Utah Code Ann. ^ 6/-19a-
401(5) (2000). 'fhc term excusable neglect is not defined in the statute. Instead, the
CSRB is expressly authorized to define this phrase.
"bxcusablc Neglect" means the exercise of due diligence by a
reasonably prudent person and constitutes a failure to take proper steps at
the proper time, not m consequence of the person's own carelessness,
inattention, or willful disregard in the processing of a gne\ance. but in
consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.
I "tah Administrative Code. R 13"-] -2.
Applying its definition of excusable neglect to the facts, the CSRB determined that
the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that their delay in filing their grievance was due
to excusable neglect. R. 50S-17. In interpreting its rule, the CSRB explained that its use
of the phrase "some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance" should be read as requiring
"circumstances that are essentially beyond a person's control." R. 510.
In Holland v. Career Service Re\iew Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993) , this
Court employed an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a challenge to the
Department of Human Resource Management's (DI1RM) interpretation of its own
regulation. "Thus. DIIRM's application of that rule was reasonable and rational.
Accordingly. \\c conclude that DHRM did not abuse its discretion in determining that
I lolland was not eligible for automatic reappointment under that rule." kf at 682. In the
same manner. CSRB's interpretation of its own rules is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
It is left to the discretion of the agency that authored a rule to interpret the same, so
long as that interpretation is rational and reasonable. In L.M. v. Briggs, 922 P.2d 754.
757 (Utah 1996). the court held thai a school board's interpretation of its own rules would
he reviewed only to determine if it was arbitrary or capricious.
This Court, and the i lah Supreme Court, have repeatedly stated that an
administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules is entitled to deference and will not
he reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. ('oncerned Parents oj" Stepchildren v.
Milchcj], 045 P.2d 629. 633 (Utah 1982) (as a general proposition, an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations is entitled lo defciencej; Mj^Knj_ght v. State J and
Board. 381 P.2d 726. 730 (Utah 1903) ("Courts usually will not override an
administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules unless the interpretation is
obviously arbitrary or erroneous"); Ashcroft v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 855 P.2d 267,
269-70 (I tah App. 1993) (agency's interpretation of its own rules will not be disturbed
unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality").
This same issue was before the United States Supreme Court in Board of
Education of Rogers. Arkansas v. MeCluskey. 45S I .S. 966 (1982). MeCluskey involved
the single issue of whether the lower courts had correctly determined that the school
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board's construction of the word "drugs" in its rules as including alcoholic beverages was
unreasonable. In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court explained:
In any case, even if the District Court's and the Court of Appeals' views of
§ 11 struck us as clearly preferable to the Board's - which they do not - the
Board's interpretation of its regulations controls under Wood v. Strickland.
The Chairman of the Board testified that the Board had interpreted § 11 as
requiring the suspension of students found intoxicated on school grounds
for a number of years prior to respondent's suspension, and it is undisputed
that the Board had the authority to suspend students for that reason. We
conclude that the District Court and the Court of Appeals plainly erred in
replacing the Board's construction of § 11 with their own notions under the
facts of this case.
kf at 971.
The Supreme Court of Vermont followed the MeCluskey decision in Lilly v.
Vermont Headmasters Ass'n. Inc.. 648 A.2d 810 (Vt. 1993). Lilly involved the proper
inteipretation of an eligibility rule of the Vermont Ileadmastcrs Association (VHA). The
plaintiff claimed that the dctenriination that he was ineligible to play high school hockey
was invalid due to the VHA's misinterpretation of its policies. The Vermont Supreme
Court, following MeCluskey. reversed the lower court's substitution of its interpretation
of the VHA rule for the VHA's own interpretation.
The present appeal turns on the determination of whether the VHA
has the final say as to the interpretation of its own rules, or if the court is
authorized to override the VHA in interpreting a rule in a manner contrary
to that expressly stated by the VHA itself.
Wc disagree with the court's substitution of its own interpretation of
the rule for that of the VHA where the rule in question was reasonable and
related to a goal that the court itself found to be unchallenged.
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Even if the rule in question admits of two interpretations, the VHA,
as an educational association entrusted with the regulation of extracurricular
activities, is entitled to interpret its rule as it sees fit.
14 at 811-12.
The CSRB's application of its excusable neglect rule is both reasonable and
rational. The petitioners knew that they were spending time in an on-call status. The
state rule concerning compensation for on-call time was available to them. The
petitioners, from July 1997 on, were being compensated for on-call time when they
served as the Officer in Charge. R. 373-74, 510-12.
Finally, there is an inherent inconsistency in Grievants' argument
that they continued to fear possible retaliation after July 1997, while
simultaneously reporting on-call time for which they were compensated.
Considering all of the foregoing facts, the Hearing Officer feels compelled
to conclude that Grievants did not meet the standard of excusable neglect in
the filing of their grievance.
R. 374-75.
The CSRB did not abuse its discretion by the manner it interpreted its rule
concerning excusable neglect. That decision should therefore be affirmed on appeal.
III. PETTI IIONERS NEED TO TIMELY FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE
WAS NOT TOLLED BY A DISCOVERY RULE
Petitioners' final argument is that the statutory time frame for filing their grievance
was tolled. They claim that prior administrations of the department denied that
petitioners had a cause of action, or concealed that such a cause of action might exist.
Brief of Appellants/Petitioners at 29-30. This argument fails because the discovery rule
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deals with a plaintiffs knowledge of the facts underlying a claim and not the plaintiffs
knowledge of whether a cause of action exists.2 Plaintiff cannot make the threshold
showing necessary for the use of the discovery rule.
'I he first step in determining whether the discovery rule applies is to
examine whether the Scvys made the threshold showing that they did not
know, nor should have known, of Security Title's netiliuence at the time of
the closing. See id.. (|A]n initial showing must be made that plaintiff did
not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the
cause ot action in time to file a claim within the limitation period."].
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (l'tah 1995).
Mere ignorance ol the existence of the cause of action does not permit the plaintiff
to use the disco\ery rule. Myers v. McOonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (l'tah 1981). The
plamtiil must show that he "did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the
tacts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action" before the statute of
limitations ran. Bukhol/ v. Joyce. 972 P.2d 1235. 1237 (Utah 199S); Walker Drug Co.,
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). It was not necessary that
petitioners knew all of the facts underlying their claim for on-call compensation, simply
that they knew sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on notice of the duty to inquire.
Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125. 1129-30 (Utah 1992); Anderson v. Dean
: Footnotes I 1 and 13 in the Brief of Appellants/Petitioners (pages 12-13)
speculate as to possible open courts arguments that might exist. This issue should be
disregarded because the petitioners have failed to adequately brief any constitutional
claim. "An issue is inadequate!}' briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden ol research and argument to the reviewing court." Smith v
Sinith. 1999 U'l App 370. *'S. 995 P.2d 14 (quotations and citations omitted);
Witter RevnoKIs, Inc., 920 P.2d 575. 5/9 (Utah Ct. App 1996) ("The limitations period is
postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal
theories."). Petitioners only needed to have "sulficieni. information to apprise (the
plaintiffs of the underlying cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make further
inquiry it they harbor doubts or questions about the defendant's actions." Berenda v.
I angford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996).
The CSRB and its hearing officer correctly determined that the petitioners had
sufficient facts to put them on notice. The state rule dealing with on-call compensation
was at all times available, further, the petitioners had been receding on-call
compensation for time spent as Officer in Charge since July 1997, The CSRB did not err
in finding that the 20 working day statute of limitations was not tolled anil that decision
should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the CSRB's final agency action should be
affirmed.
RESPONDENTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL
AIUilMKNTOR A PI BITSIIED OPINION
Respondents do not request oral argument and a published opinion in this matter.
The questions raised by this petition are not such that oral argument or a published
opinion is necessary, though the respondents desire to participate in oral argument if it is
held by the Court.
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